UCLA Journal of Islamic and Near Eastern Law

This Article aims to answer two main research questions. The first examines the similarities and differences between the Lochner case and Islamic law to determine whether Islamic law has any counterparts or parallels to Lochne r jurisprudence.

The second research question focuses on examining the core values of the employment relationship, as viewed in both the Lochner case and Islamic legal thought.

To clarify the first question, this Article discusses two themes in Islamic law: government intervention in pricing and its ability to enforce taxes. It additionally considers Al-Hisba legal system as a complementary part of the “pricing” theme. Similarly, the waqf (endowment) system is a fundamental part of discussing the rule of taxes. Regarding the second question, this Article references various Islamic law rulings to illustrate the different core values from both the Lochner case and Islamic law perspectives. Islamic law shares some similarities with Lochner case philosophy and other economic philosophies. However, it also has its own peculiarities and characteristics, based on different aspects of Islamic law jurisprudence.

This Article has the following goals, divided into three respective parts .First, it seeks to locate the Fatāwā-yi ʿĀlamgīrī in its historical and juridical context. Building on earlier findings by historians and legal scholars of late medieval and early modern India, Part I historicizes the Fatāwā Hindīyya in its early modern context, and more specifically, within the legal genre of state-sponsored juristic compilations, beginning with the qānūnnāmihs (kanunnames) and fatwa collections of the Seljuk Empire (1016–1307) and Delhi Sultanate (1206–1526), and proceeding to the Ottoman and Mughal empires from the fifteenth through seventeenth centuries. In the process it explores how questions of codifying fiqh took on a new meaning with the groundbreaking juristic project described in this Article as “proto-codification,” a process launched with Awrangzīb’s imperial patronage and culminating in the Fatāwā-yi ʿĀlamgīrī.

Not merely a philosophical concept, human dignity is a legal and moral imperative—especially in times of conflict, mass displacement, and ethnic cleansing. Looking to the ongoing Gaza Genocide, the denial of dignity and humanitarian aid has become a calculated weapon of war. This Article builds on dignity frameworks and contemporary human rights law to argue that humanitarian aid is an obligation rooted in law and the inherent dignity of the Palestinian people. It critiques the Israeli occupation’s deliberate withholding of aid as a way to dehumanize Palestinians, while also exploring the legal, philosophical, and practical dimensions of how dignity-centered aid can restore not just survival, but agency and justice.

Gazans have endured decades of illegal besiegement where they are both recipients of heavily restricted aid and victims of a system designed to strip them of their autonomy. Israeli officials have explicitly weaponized aid; Defense Minister Yoav Gallant even declared, “We are fighting human animals, and we act accordingly,” reinforcing the legacy of dehumanization. Such rhetoric serves to not only justify the withholding of aid, but to erase Palestinian humanity altogether. In contrast, international law reaffirms the right to aid, “The humanitarian situation in Gaza is dire. We must ensure the unimpeded provision of lifesaving aid to civilians, in line with international law, said UN Secretary- General António Guterres.

This Article: (1) builds on human rights law and human dignity frameworks to establish human dignity as a compelling moral and legal foundation for aid in Gaza during the ongoing Genocide; (2) reframes dignity as a justification for intervention under international law, addressing philosophical dimensions; (3) critiques the Israeli occupation’s denial of dignity to Palestinians, demonstrating how aid can reinforce power imbalances; and (4) proposes dignity-based reforms for equitable humanitarian intervention, addressing the structural indignities imposed by decades of occupation.

Theories of apocalyptic government (the global polity that will govern humanity in the End Times) provide an important lens for differentiating political movements and understanding their legal and political ambitions. These theories comprise a range of questions: What is the time span of the final government—i.e., how long will humanity survive before universal annihilation? Will the final government involve separation of powers? Will its form be democratic, autocratic, socialist, or otherwise? Will it preserve the boundaries of nation-states? How will it relate to existing supranational political entities, such as the United Nations? How will the political leadership be constituted, including its mechanisms of succession? How will its administrative and bureaucratic apparatus be organized? This Article considers such questions within the Islamic context by examining four case studies: (1) the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”), (2) Muḥammad ‘Īsa Dāwūd and his “Awaited Mahdi” political party in Egypt, (3) the Islamic Republic of Iran, as represented by three de facto theorists, and (4) the Ṣadrist movement in Iraq, as represented by the movement’s former leader.  While these case studies may appear to be superficially similar, their theories of apocalyptic governance and constitutional law differ markedly.

This article presents a critical examination of Islamic commercial laws as compared to modern banking rules. The analysis underscores the impact of Islamic banking, its revival, and how its globalization has changed the way of banking in different eras. This article analyses the core concept, meaning, origin and background of Islamic banking laws and focuses on the main principles of Islamic contracts that guide the agreement between parties and ensure smooth functioning of businesses. The overall argument of this article is to reinforce the need and significance of Islamic commercial law as a tool to encourage faithful business conducted in a way which benefits all parties to a contract. By comparing both models of Islamic and conventional banking transactions, this article argues that Shari’ah not only aligns with modern business practices, but also encourages fairness, transparency and accountability. Applications of Islamic commercial law ensure ethical conduct in trading and contemporary banking transactions, the products of which provide real life case studies of fair, transparent and accountable banking.

Campaigns highlighting the alleged incompatibility of the Islamic polity with principles of democratic self-governance are longstanding. The basic assumption of the incompatibalist proposition runs as follows: Political legitimacy in Muslim polities can be reduced to a principle of conformity with a set of divinely given rules and norms, the Sharīʿa, occasionally supplemented, and interpreted, by Islamic legal scholars and practitioners. In short, political Islam recognizes the Sharīʿa and Usūl al-fiqh (or, for the purposes of this essay, fiqh, for short) as the Islamic polity’s foundations––those are deemed incompatible with democratic participation. In response, Mohammad Fadel (2018) has argued that the legal instrument of maṣlaḥa, which Fadel summarizes as considerations of the “public good” or “general interest,” can establish the democratic accountability mechanism that critics see missing in political authorities of Sharīʿa–grounded polities. Fadel supports this normative view with reference to some select classical Sunni jurisprudence, particularly the Usūl al-fiqh. I contest this view in two ways: Firstly, on a conceptual level, most thorough analyses of democracy acknowledge responsiveness and active involvement as fundamental components of democratic self-rule. Fadel’s idea of maṣlaḥa does not entirely align with this notion. Secondly, from a doctrinal standpoint, Fadel’s argument is confined solely within the classical Sunni context. That means, Fadel’s argument is contingent upon a significant departure from numerous (potentially the majority) sources within a comprehensive lineage of maṣlaḥa.

The following paper will provide a condensed, yet comprehensive overview of the Iranian legal system from the 19th century up to the present day. Its focus will be on both the history of Iranian jurisprudence as well as the evolution of Iran’s legal system. We will examine three specific periods in order to illustrate how the legal system has evolved. These periods include: the Qajar period during the 19th century, prior to the Constitutional Revolution of 1906; the period following the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 and the establishment of the Pahlavi Dynasty; and finally, the period following the Islamic Revolution of 1979 up to the 21st century.